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THE TREND OF SUPREME COURT TAX
DECISIONS
The Constitution grants Congress the "Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare".
No more essential or important power has been conferred
upon the Congress and the presumption that an Act of
Congress is valid applies with added force and weight to a
levy of public revenue. '
W17ITH such majestic flourish is sounded the attitude of the
VVSupreme Court in its analysis of problems presented for
its consideration. The volume of tax legislation, and actions
testing its constitutionality, is sufficient material for periodic
consideration, but the innovating character of recent Su-
preme Court decisions lends itself to a probe of the changes
in course and attitude to be found in recent declarations of
that tribunal.2 Change there has been. Hardly a month
passes but what some new principle or striking distinction
catches the eye and ear of Mr. Taxpayer. Whether the new
attitude augurs well for those concerned must be given fair
consideration, in the light of a changed personnel of the
Court and in the light of fluctuating world conditions.
The importance of revenue to state and federal govern-
ments cannot be overemphasized. The staggering sum which
will be required as a result of the lend-lease bill 3 might be
cited as an example. Whether it is wiser to have fewer classi-
fications of taxes and'higher rates or vice versa has been a
source of difference of opinion, economic, social and political,
for decades. Legislative bodies in the main have adopted the
procedure of creating new sources of revenues. Analysis of
all classifications would serve no useful purpose here, but the
multiplying of diverse sources of revenue has opened the door
to materially increased litigation. The function of the judi-
cial bodies has been to fashion a pattern. To uphold the due
I Mr. Justice Black, United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 369, 59 Sup.
Ct. 551 (1939). Italics mine.
2 The article is only intended to consider a survey of Supreme Court deci-
sions beginning with the October Term, 1938 and ending February 17, 1941,
except where comparisons are made with previous decisions of that body.3 HousE RESOLUTION 1776 signed by the President on March 11, 1941.
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process clause of the Constitution, and yet not defeat the aim
of Congress and state legislatures to obtain revenue from
multiplied sources, has become the oversized problem child of
the Court.4 An important burden is placed upon the members
thereof. In the field of taxation, as in other fields, it is desir-
able that stability and regularity in its pronouncements be
maintained. For without that, those directly concerned can-
not chart their course in economic pursuits. The resulting
chaos from quickly changed opinions redounds to the disad-
vantage not only of the taxpayer, but of the government.
Multiple taxation tends to curb economic spheres. Legisla-
tion, however intelligently planned, must meet with conflict
where forty-eight states and the federal government are con-
cerned. One quickly realizes the importance of Supreme
Court decisions, seeking to perfect a homogeneous pattern
out of a heterogeneous mass.
Whether the changed personnel of the Court or the ex-
igencies of world economic conditions may be cited as the
cause, one cannot escape the conclusion, from a reading of
recent Supreme Court decisions, that there has been a change
in the fundamental philosophy behind the language. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has stated that now the Court is merely
reading the Constitution as it was written.5 From this state-
ment the uninitiate might wonder if that was not the dele-
gated duty of his predecessors.
A comparison of recent decisions with other decisions,
4 Mr. Attorney General Jackson, upon the occasion of the 150th Anniversary
of the Court touched upon the beginning of this problem when he stated, "From
the very beginning the duties of the Court required it, by interpretation of the
Constitution, to settle doubts which the framers themselves had been unable to
resolve. Luther Martin, in his great plea in McCulloch v. Maryland, was not
only an advocate but a witness of what had been and a prophet of things to
come. He said: 'The whole of this subject of taxation is full of difficulties,
which the Convention found it impossible to solve, in a manner entirely satisfac-
tory'. * * * The judgments and opinions of this Court deeply penetrate the
intellectual life of the nation. This Court is more than an arbiter of cases and
controversies. It is the custodian of a culture and is the protector of a philoso-
phy -of equal rights, of civil liberty, of tolerance, and of trusteeship of political
and economic power, general acceptance of which gives us a basic national unity.
Without it our representative system would be impossible." 309 U. S. VI, VIII.
5 -* * * Judicial exegesis is unavoidable with reference to an organic act
like our Constitution, drawn in many particulars with purposed vagueness so as
to leave room for the unfolding future. But the ultimate touchstone of consti-
tutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." Graves
v. New York, 306 U. S. 466, 491, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939).
[ VOL. 15
1941] TREND OF SUP. COURT TAX DECISIONS 205
both recent and of long standing, is opportune. In the inter-
ests of orderliness they may be divided into subdivisions.8
INCOME
Out of the famous landmark in judicial history, Mc~u-
lock v. Maryland7 sprang the immunity from taxation of
one governmental instrumentality by another. As that deci-
sion denied the states the right to tax instrumentalities of the
United States, the decision in Collector v. Daj 8 held that the
United States was without power to tax the salary of a state
officer. Peculiarly with regard to salaries of administrative
officers and servants of both instrumentalities the immunity
was preserved by judicial endorsement.9 True, distinctions
were made between officers or servants and contractors."°
But even as recently as 1937 the immunity of a salary of an
employee of a governmental instrumentality was reaffirmed. 1
The turning point came in Helvering v. Gerhardt.2 There
the Court held that the salaries of employees of the New York
Port Authority, a state instrumentality created by New York
and New Jersey, were not immune from a federal income tax,
even though the Authority be regarded as not subject to fed-
eral taxation. It remained for the present Court in Graves v.
6 Although all decisions bearing on tax questions decided since the October
1938 Term have been considered only those regarded by the writer as significant
in view of past judicial utterances and of possible future importance are con-
sidered herein.
74 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
8 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
9 Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S. 1842) (Pennsylvania tax on
the office of the captain of a federal revenue cutter held invalid) ; Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922) (income derived by a lessee
from bonds leased to him by a government in the performance of a governmen-
tal function. The principle in this decision was later restricted in Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, 58 Sup. Ct. 623 (1938)) ; New York
ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269 (1937) (salary of
general counsel of a federal instrumentality held immune from state income
tax) ; Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct.
495 (1937).
10 Metcalf D. Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172 (1926);
James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208 (1937).
11 New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269(1937) ; Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352, 57 Sup. Ct.
495 (1937).
12 304 U. S. 405, 58 Sup. Ct 969 (1938).
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New York 13 to step forth and definitely overrule past deci-
sions on this phase of immunity. 14 The gist of the new trend
is clearly explained. The Court stated: "The arguments upon
which Mcullooh v. Maryland * * * rested had their roots in
actuality. But they have been distorted by sterile refinements
unrelated to affairs." 15 Whatever criticism may come forth
as a result of the reversal of New York ew rel. Rogers v.
Graves,'. decided just two years before, the new principle
appears sound economically. It has opened the door to new
13 306 U. S. 466, 59 Sup. Ct. 595 (1939) (the Court upheld the right of
the State of New York to tax the income of an attorney for the Home Owners
Loan Corporation, a federal instrumentality).
14 "Collector v. Day (Buffington & Day) 11 Wall. 113 and New York
ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, supra, are overruled so
far as they recognize an implied constitutional immunity from income taxation
of the salaries of officers or employees of the national or a state government or
their instrumentalities." See n'ote 13, supra, at 486.
15 See note 13, supra, at 488. Mr. Justice Frankfurter further explained:
"For one hundred and twenty years this Court has been concerned with claims
of immunity from taxes imposed by one authority in our dual system of govern-
ment because of the taxpayer's relation to the other. The basis for the Court's
intervention in this field has not been any explicit provision of the Constitution.
The States, after they formed the Union, continued to have the same range of
taxing power which they had before barring only duties affecting exports,
imports and on tonnage. Congress, on the other hand, to lay taxes in order 'to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general welfare of the
United States,' Art. I, § 8, can reach every person and every dollar in the land
with due regard to Constitutional limitations as to the method of laying taxes.
But, as is true of other great activities of the state and national governments,
the fact that we are a federalism raises problems regarding these vital powers
of taxation. Since two governments have authority within the same territory,
neither through its powers to tax can be allowed to cripple the operations of the
other. Therefore state and federal governments must avoid exactions which
discriminate against each other or obviously interfere with one another's opera-
tions. These were the determining considerations that led the great Chief
Justice to strike down the Maryland statute as an unambiguous measure of
discrimination against the use by the United States of the Bank of the United
States as one of its instruments of government. * * * Partly as a flourish of
rhetoric and partly because the intellectual fashion of the times indulged a free
use of absoltites, Chief Justice Marshall gave currency to the phrase that 'the
power of tax involves the power to destroy.' Id. at p. 431. This dictum was
treated as though it were a constitutional mandate. But not without protest.
One of the most trenchant minds on the Marshall Court, Justice William
Johnson, early analyzed the dangerous inroads upon the political freedom of the
States and the Union within their respective orbits resulting from a doctrinaire
application of the generalities uttered in the course of the opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland. The seductive clich6 that the power to tax involves the power to
destroy was fused with another assumption, likewise not to be found in the
Constitution itself, namely the doctrine that the immunities are correlative-
because the existence of the national government implies immunities from state
taxation, the existence of state governments implies equivalent immunities from
federal taxation. When this doctrine was first applied Mr. Justice Bradley
registered a powerful dissent, the force of which gathered rather than lost
strength with time" (at 488-489).
16 See note 13, supra.
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revenues for the federal and state governments. It still re-
mains for the Court, however, to select the "instrumentali-
ties of government" to be immunized against. To paraphrase
the words of an eminent jurist, this is a signpost on the
road. 7
Of less moment, but an unfortunate decision, was that
rendered by the Court in Welch v. Henry 8 upholding a Wis-
consin emergency income tax. A 1935 statute levied a tax
upon dividends received by a Wisconsin resident in 1933.
They had theretofore been exempt. It was the only 1933
deductible item made the subject of tax by the 1935 Act, and
it was taxed at a different rate than that applied to 1935 in-
comes from any other sources. No provision was made for de-
ductions such as items of interest, taxes, business losses and
donations available to other taxpayers in 1935. Petitioner
contended a denial of equal protection because the dividends
which it selected for taxation as a special class were subjected
ratably to a tax burden different from that borne by other
types of income for the same year. The dividends were taxed
at a different rate from that applied to other income, and
were given the benefit of but a single deduction of $750.00,
while recipients of other types of income in that year were
permitted to deduct specified items of interest, taxes, busi-
ness losses and donations; and that the disparity in the tax
burden which resulted from the different rates and deductions
infringed a constitutional immunity. To no avail! The Court
was faced with the necessity of upholding an emergency tax.
The taxpayer was required to anticipate that some day, when
the public coffers required additional income, he might be
called upon to pay a tax on income which a reasonable person
might expect he had a right to dispose of and might well have
so done.19 The dissent points out the danger of encouraging
17 Per Cardozo, Ch. J., in Allegheny- Col. v. Nat Chautauqua Co. Bank,
246 N. Y. 369, 374, 159 N. E. 173, 175 (1927).
18305 U. S. 134, 59 Sup. Ct. 121 (1938).
19 TeCourt distinguished the gift cases, Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S.
531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710 (1927)g; Unteryeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup.
Ct. 353 (1928) (citing Blodgett v. Holden, 275-U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105(1927)); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U. S. 582, 51 Sup. Ct. 306 (1931) as being
arbitrary and oppressive. The distinction is doubtful. In Milliken v. United
States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct 324 (1931), relied upon by the majority of the
Court in support of its decision in the instant case, supra note 18, in a succession
tax where a gift was made in contemplation of death, in 1916, and the death
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the validity of this type of tax. Mr. Justice Roberts pointed
out: 20
Most, if not all, the states have long maintained the policy of exempt-
ing places of religious worship from annual tax levies. Will it be
contended that if the state were now to impose a tax on the value of
such exempt property for some past year, the action would not be
an arbitrary taking of property as well as a hostile discrimination?
COMPENSATING USE AND SALES
(a)
The now familiar use and sales taxes have been strength-
ened in their effectiveness. In its experimental stage the em-
ployment of a sales tax generally was restricted in its appli-
cation, for fear of running afoul of interstate commerce re-
strictions. After a while, however, the states, realizing that
the cloak of interstate commerce was being employed to cir-
cumvent the sales tax in some instances, and that goods in
interstate commerce were deriving a privilege not given to
intrastate goods, enacted use taxes as a popular complement
to the former. It would now appear that the use tax has
established itself for effectiveness, to a greater extent than
the sales tax. The outstanding cases on this class of tax legis-
lation are to be found in Soutkern Pacific Co. v. Gallag4er 21
and its companion case Pacific Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Gafla-
gher.22 In the former the Court had before it for considera-
tion a California use tax, at the same rate as the California
sales tax, for the use or other consumption in the state of
property purchased from any retailer. Property covered by
the sales tax was exempt under the use tax. Petitioner, a
Kentucky corporation, handled intrastate, interstate and for-
eign commerce over its railroad system which traversed a
number of states. It had made numerous extrastate pur-
chases of tangible personal property for the -operation of the
occurred in 1918, the 1918 tax rate was imposed and upheld. There, however,
notice is brought home to the party making the transfer, when he makes such a
transfer, designed to avoid the payment of an estate tax. Hence it is clearly
distinguishable.
20 See note 18, supra, 305 U. S. at 159. -
21306 U. S. 167, 59 Sup. Ct. 389 (1939).
22 306 U. S. 182, 59 Sup. Ct. 396 (1939).
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road: rails, equipment, machinery, tools and office supplies.
Some of the purchases were used in the general offices of the
corporation, located in California, for the supervision of
wide-flung activities; others were for material kept in readi-
ness as a stand-by supply to replace or repair equipment
damaged, destroyed or worn out in the operation of the road;
and still others were to make improvements, replacements or
extensions, pursuant to previously determined plans and
specifications. Few, if any, of the supplies were stored for
long-term needs. Storage was merely incidental to protection
until use. The petitioner contended that such a tax imposed
directly on the privilege of using instrumentalities in carry-
ing on interstate transportation was a direct and unconstitu-
tional burden on commerce. In the Paofif, Teleph. case, the
company purchased, outside of California, large amounts of
equipment, apparatus, materials and supplies shipped to it in
interstate commerce for installation in its system to enable it
to furnish telephone and telegraph services in intrastate and
interstate commerce. It likewise urged that the use tax was
a burden on interstate commerce. The Court found little
difficulty in dismissing the contentions of the petitioners.
The Court found that there came a time when the articles
purchased came to rest in the State of California. At that
point it was an event outside interstate commerce and there-
fore a proper subject of a state taxing statute. Careful dis-
tinction was drawn between the present situation and situa-
tions previously declared to be a burden on commerce. For
example, it had been held: a state cannot tax interstate tele-
graph messages; 23 interstate freight shipments; 24 that .a
license tax on sales by samples burdens one selling only goods
from other states; 25 a tax act as applied to the business of
interstate communication, where a similar levy by other
states may be imposed, with consequent multiplicity for the
same taxable event, local tax of a privilege, measured by
total gross receipts from interstate transactions, is consid-
ered identical with an exaction on the commerce itself; 26 an
2 3 Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 25 Sup. Ct. 1067 (1882).2 4 State Freight Tax Case, 82 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1872). 1
25 Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. .489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1887).26 Gwin, White & Prince v. Hen neford, 305 U. S. 434,, 59 Sup. Ct. 325
(1939).
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occupation tax measured by gross receipts from radio broad-
casting; 27 a tax on gross receipts from interstate transporta-
tion.28 The decisions in the instant cases are an extension of
principle to that contained in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
where the problem of later use in interstate commerce was
not involved. Another distinction exists. In the Henneford
case, the Washington statute provided for exemption if a
similar tax was paid elsewhere on the property. The Cali-
fornia statute made no exemption but the Court merely
stated that the time to resolie any argument concerning mul-
tiple taxation was when a taxpayer paying in the state of
origin is compelled to pay again in the state of destination.
With the door opened by the Court we may expect just that
problem in the not too distant future.
The immediate reaction to these decisions is not too dis-
turbing were it not for the increasing support given to the
use tax in the most recent pronouncement of the Court in
Nelson v. -ears, Roebuek & Co. ° In that case Sears, Roebuck
& Co., a New York corporation authorized to do business in
Iowa, had several retail stores located in that state. It paid
the tax on sales made at those stores. It also paid the tax on
orders placed at those stores, though shipment was made
direct to the purchaser from one of its branches outside the
state. However, it refused to collect the tax on mail orders
sent by Iowa purchasers to its out-of-state branches and filled
by direct shipments through the mail or by a common carrier
from those branches to the purchasers. On threat of the state
to revoke its permit to do business, it brought suit for a re-
straining injunction. The statute made the seller the agent of
the buyer for the collection of the tax. Despite the fact that
this business was dissociated from its normal Iowa business,
27 Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct.
608 (1936).
28 Philadelphia & S. Mail S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania,: 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup.
Ct. 1118 (1887). To be distinguished from a tax that does not place a burden
on interstate commerce though the taxpayer does a business of such a nature, as
for example a magazine publisher, Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546 (1938); or as to an engine used to supply
mechanical power to a compressor which increases the pressure of natural gas
and thus-permits it to be transported to purchasers in other states. Coverdale
v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.; 303 U. S. 604, 58 -Sup. Ct 736 (1938).
See also Ficklen v. Taxing Dist., 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810 (1892)..
29300 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 524 (1937).
3085 L. ed. 522 (U. S., Feb. 17, 1941).
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the Court declared that Iowa could exact this burden as a
price for enjoying the full benefits flowing from its Iowa
business. The fact that Sears, Roebuck could not be reached
for the tax if it were not qualified to do business in Iowa
would merely be the result of the impotence of state power.
The Court found no fault with the tax insofar as it discrimi-
nated between the taxpayer and other corporations outside
the state doing a mail order business with residents of the
state, which could not be reached by taxing statute. A vigo-
rous dissent was noted.3 1 In a decision bordering so closely
on the question of burdening interstate commerce the opinion
was quite devoid of judicial justification. The Court stated :32
Prohibited discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce are not to
be determined by abstractions. Particular facts of specific cases deter-
mine whether a given tax prohibitively discriminates against inter-
state commerce. Hence a review of prior adjudications based on
widely disparate facts, howsoever embedded in general propositions,
does not facilitate an answer to the present problem.
That answer makes short shrift of an important principle of
taxation as it affects interstate commerce.
(b)
Of like importance because of new interpretations is the
consideration of sales taxes. The old and familiar principle
that property shipped in interstate commerce may not be
taxed has been whittled away in part by the decision in
McGoldricko v. Berwiind-White 0o.13 In that case, by con-
tracts of sale made through a sales office in the City of New
York, a Pennsylvania corporation agreed to sell and deliver
to the purchaser in New York large quantities of coal pro-
duced at its Pennsylvania mines. The coal moved by rail to
Jersey City and thence by barge to the City of New York, and
was there delivered to the purchaser's plants or steamships.
The tax was imposed upon the seller as agent for the buyer
3' Dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Roberts, concurred in by Chief Justice
Hughes.
32 See note 30, supra, at 525.
33 309 U. S. 33, 60 Sup. Ct. 388 (1940).
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to collect the same and pay it over to the city. The taxpayer
objected to the imposition of the tax as a levy upon interstate
transportation and a consequent infringement of the com-
merce clause of the Constitution. It is interesting to note
that the highest court of the state had consistently held that
this type of transaction infringed on commerce. 34 The Su-
preme Court, however, adopted a different view. Mr. Justice
Stone in the prevailing opinion explains at length why this
tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce: 35
But it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those
engaged in interstate commerce of their just share of state tax bur-
dens, merely because an incidental or consequential effect of the tax is
an increase in the cost of doing business, Western Live Stock v.
Bureau, 303 U. S. 250, 254. Not all state taxation is to be condemned
because in some manner, it has an effect upon commerce between the
states, and there are many forms of tax whose burdens, when distrib-
uted through the play of economic forces, affect interstate commerce,
which nevertheless fall short of the regulation of the commerce which
the Constitution leaves to Congress.
It would appear therefore that if there is no discrimination
in the rate imposed on intrastate or interstate sales, no undue
burden on commerce exists as would give rise to a question
of unconstitutionality. The Court held that the burden of
the tax is essentially on the buyer and that therefore no
added imposition is enforced upon the seller though he brings
his goods from without the state. But, as pointed out by
Hughes, Ch. J., in his dissenting opinion, the Comptroller has
assessed the tax against the seller. The statute required the
seller, under penalty, to file a return of its sales and pay the
tax. To enforce payment, the property of the seller may be
levied upon under a Comptroller's warrant. It had been held
by the state court that the contention that the seller was
required only to collect the tax as the agent of the buyer
could not be sustained and it was decided that in case of
41Matter of National Cash Register Co. v. Taylor, 276 N. Y. 208, 11
N. E. (2d) 881 (1937); Matter of Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v.
McGoldrick, 279 N. Y. 192, 18 N. E. (2d) 28 (1938); McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Co., 281 N. Y. 610, 22 N. E. (2d) 173 (1939).
35 See note 33, supra, 309 U. S. at 46, 47.
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the seller's insolvency, the city was entitled to priority of
payment.3 6
The conflict in opinion may be crystallized by a compari-
son of the statement by Mr. Justice Stone with that by Chief
Justice Hughes, who said: 37
Undoubtedly the problem of maintaining the proper balance between
state and national power has been a most difficult one. We have rec-
ognized the power of the State to meet local exigencies in protecting
health and safety and preventing fraud, as for example, in the case of
36 Matter of Atlas Television Co., 273 N. Y. 51, 6 N. E. (2d) 94 (1936).
See also Matter of Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Taylor, 275 N. Y. 113,
9 N. E. (2d) 709 (1937).
37 See note 33, supra, 309 U. S. at 61-62. The Chief Justice also declared:
"We have said in a long line of decisions, that the State cannot tax interstate
commerce either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such
commerce or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such derived
from it. The same principle has been declared in recent cases. In Fisher's
Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 655, we said: 'As appellant's
income is derived from interstate commerce, the tax measured by appellant's
gross income, is of a type which has long been held to be an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce'. There, a state occupation tax upon the gross
receipts of the owner of a radio station from broadcasting programs to listeners
within and beyond the State was held invalid. It was said to be enough that
the tax was levied on gross receipts from the proprietor's 'entire operations,
which include interstate commerce. Id. p. 656. In Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, a tax on the gross receipts from the sale of
advertising by a trade journal was sustained because in the last -analysis the
tax, like that upon the privilege of manufacturing within the State, was upon
the carrying on of a local business in the preparing, printing and publishing a
magazine. Id. p. 258. Soon after, we held in Adams Manufacturing Co. v.
Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 311, that a state tax could not be constitutionally applied
to the gross receipts derived by an Indiana corporation in interstate commerce
through the sale of its products manufactured in Indiana to customers in other
State. And, but a year ago, in Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S.
434, 435, 436, 438, we held invalid a state tax measured by the gross receipts
from the business of marketing fruit shipped in interstate commerce from the
State of production to places in other States where the sales and deliveries were
made and the proceeds collected. If the question now before us is controlled by
precedent, the result would seem to be clear.
"In relation to the present transaction, it would hardly be contended that
New York could tax the transportation of the coal from Pennsylvania to New
York or a contract for that transportation. But the movement of the coal from
the one State to the other was definitely required by the contracts of sale and
these sales must be regarded as an essential part of the commercial intercourse
contemplated by the commerce clause. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188.
The tax on the gross receipts of the seller from these sales was manifestly an
imposition upon the sales themselves. Whether the tax be small or large, it is
plainly to the extent of it a burden upon interstate commerce; and as it is
imposed immediately upon the gross receipts from that commerce, it is a direct
burden. And, as we have often said, where what is taxed is subject to the
jurisdiction of the State, the size of the tax lies within -the discretion of the
State and not of the Court. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 45.
See also Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 48" (at 63-64). McReynolds
and Roberts, JJ., joined with the Chief Justice in the dissent.
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quarantine, pilotage and inspection laws, although interstate or for-
eign commerce is involved; that is, until Congress in the exercise of
its paramount authority displaces such local requirements. We have
also recognized the power of the State to tax property subject to its
jurisdiction although the property has come from another State, when
it is found that interstate commerce has ended and that the property
has become a part of the common mass within the State. We have
sustained the authority of the State to impose occupation taxes when
they were deemed to be so measured or apportioned as to relate appro-
priately to the privilege of transacting an intrastate business. The
application of these principles has led to close distinctions. But that
fact would seem to present no good reason for sweeping away the
protection of interstate commerce where the State lays a' direct tax
upon that commerce as in this case.
In the companion case, McGoldrick v. Felt d Tarrant Co.,38
decided the same day as the Berwind-White case, the Court
adopted the same principle. The distinguishing facts in that
decision were that the contracts were not approved in New
York but at the home office out of the state and the proceeds
of the sales were paid directly to the home office out of the
state.
One suspects that the door is now open not only to
increased revenue to the states but as well to increased legis-
lation looking toward greater state dominion over what once
was regarded as interstate commerce. The Court does not
say that it will not interfere in any question of interstate
commerce except where Congress legislates with regard to it.
In that respect itsattitude has not changed from the attitude
heretofore maintained by it. It reserves the right to define
commerce and its immunities, but its basic philosophy is one
designed to advance the economic interests of the states. It is
doubtful therefore that in this phase of constitutionality it is
merely reading the Constitution as it was written. Rather it
is proclaiming what it believes to be a sound interpretation
of the commerce clause. Whether or not that view will bear
the fruit of its seed remains for the future. Governments are
jealous mistresses, and the ultimate result may be the federal
curbing of state designs should the need therefor arise. Such
is the adaptability of the Constitution.
38 309 U. S. 70, 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (1940).
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ESTATE
The subject of multiple taxation has received its share of
Court interest in the field of estate taxation. It had long been
held that in the administration of an estate, only the state
wherein real property was situated could tax such prop-
erty. 9 Similarly, and more recently, the Court in the well
known Frick v. Pennsylvania 40 decision declared that tan-
gible property was taxable where situated though the owner
be not domiciled there. As to intangibles the Supreme Court
in 1929 in two decisions, Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Virginia 41
and Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota,42 had occasion to express
its views on the multiple taxation of intangibles. In the Safe
Deposit case, a citizen of Virginia transferred a fund of
stocks and bonds to a Maryland trust company in trust for
his two minor sons. The trustee was empowered to change
the investments and to accumulate the income, first paying
taxes and its own commissions, and as each son attained the
age of twenty-five years, was to pay him one-half of the prin-
"cipal with the income accumulated thereon. If either son
died before receiving his share, his share was to be paid over
to his children; otherwise it was to be added to that of the
surviving son and held for his use or benefit in the same man-
ner as the original share of that son was held. The donor
reserved to himself the power of revocation, but died in Vir-
ginia without exercising it. The trust company continued to
hold the original securities in Maryland and paid the taxes
regularly demanded by city and state on account of them.
Administration of the donor's estate was had in Virginia,
where the two sons were domiciled. The State of Virginia
imposed a tax upon the entire corpus of the trust estate by
regarding the sons, in conjunction with the administrator, as
the real owners of it. The Court held such a tax unconstitu-
tional by declaring that a statute of a state which undertakes
39 The decisions affirming the principle of taxation where real property is
situated are legion.
40268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925).
41280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
42280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). The writer had occa'sion to issue
comment on this decision shortly after it was delivered. (1930) 4 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 322.
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to tax things wholly beyond her jurisdiction or control con-
flicts with the Fourteenth Amendment. 43
In the Farmers Loan case the decedent was a resident of
New York. He owned and kept in his possession negotiable
bonds of the State of Minnesota and its municipalities. After
his death his estate was probated in New York and that state
exacted a tax on the testamentary transfer. Minnesota sought
to impose a transfer tax on so much of the decedent's estate
as was represented by its bonds. The Court held that tax
unconstitutional, and then stated:
While debts have no actual territorial.situs we have ruled that a State
may properly apply the rule mobilia sequentur personan, and treat
them as localized at the creditor's domicile for taxation purposes.
Tangibles with permanent situs therein, and their testamentary trans-
fer, may be taxed only by the State where they are found. And, we
think, the general reasons declared sufficient to inhibit taxation of them
by two States apply with no less force to intangibles with taxable situs
imposed by due application of the legal fiction. Primitive conditions
have passed, business is now transacted on a national scale. A very
large part of the country's wealth is invested in negotiable securities
whose protection against discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxa-
tion is matter of the greatest moment. Twenty-four years ago Union
Refrig. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra declared "in view of the enor-
mous increase of such property (tangible personalty) since the intro-
duction of railways and growth of manufactures, the tendency has
been in recent years to treat it as having a situs of its own for the
purpose of taxation and correlatively to exempt (it) at the domicile
43 In a vigorous dissent Mr. Justice Holmes stated: "I see no other fact to
cut down Virginia's power. It is true that the conception of domicil has been
applied to tangible personal property and it is now established that a State cannot
tax the owner of such property if it is permanently situated in another State.
But hitherto the decisions have been confined to tangibles that in a plain and
obvious way owed their protection to another power. Union' Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 206. It seemed to me going pretty far
to discover even that limitation in the Fourteenth Amendment. It opens vistas
to extend the restrictions to stocks and bonds in a way that I cannot reconcile
with Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1. Taxes generally are imposed upon
persons, for the general advantages of living within the jurisdiction, not upon
property although generally measured more or less by reference to the riches
of the person taxed, on grounds not of fiction but of fact." See note 41, supra,
280 U. S. at 97. And again in a dissent in the Fartners decision, see note 42,
supra, he declared: "A good deal has to be read into the Fourteenth Amendment
to give it any bearing upon this case. The Amendment does not condemn every-
thing that we may think undesirable on economic or social grounds" (280 U: S.
at 218).
44 See note 42, supra, 280 U. S. at 211-212.
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of the owner! And, certainly existing conditions no less imperatively
demand protection of choses in action against multiplied taxation
whether following misapplication of some legal fiction or conflicting
theories concerning the sovereign's right to exact contributions. For
many years the trend of decisions here has been in that direction."
The views adopted in these decisions became the recog-
nized authority for taxing bodies. It remained for the pres-
ent Court to point a future trend, for in 1939 it delivered the
opinions in Curry v. McCanless,45 and Grwves v. Elliott.46 In
the Curry case the decedent, a resident of Tennessee, trans-
ferred securities to a trustee in Alabama to hold, to pay over
the income to the creator of the trust during her lifetime, and
reserving to her the right to dispose of the trust estate by her
will, the corpus to be held in trust for her husband and chil-
dren in default of disposition by will. The trust was admin-
istered in Alabama where the securities were at all times
located. The Court held that both states had the right to
impose a tax on the testamentary transfer. The Court deemed
significant the fact that in this case the decedent had exer-
cised her power as to the disposition of the property by will. 47
But in the Graves case, though a similar power was reserved,
it was not exercised. Both decisions reached the same con-
clusion. The dissents of Holmes, J. in the Safe Deposit and
Farmers cases have at last found their sentiment in the pre-
45 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939); (1939) 13 ST. Joint's L. Rv.
195. Dissenting opinion by Reed, J., concurred in by Hughes, Ch. J., McRey-
nolds and Roberts, 33.
46 307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct 913 (1939); (1939) 13 ST. JoHN's L. Rv.
195. Dissenting opinion by Hughes, Ch. J., concurred in by McReynolds, But-
ler and Roberts, JJ.
47 The Court stated that the power of disposition is equivalent to ownership.
This argument would seem to fall in the light of the logic of Hughes, Ch. J., in
his dissenting opinion in the Graves decision, see note 46, supra. Referring, for
purposes of comparison of Frick v. Pewtsylvania and the instant case, he stated:
"It is said that the power of disposition is equivalent to ownership, and that its
relinquishment at death is an appropriate subject of taxation. The case of
federal taxation is not analogous as there are no state boundaries to be consid-
ered when the federal tax is laid. Nor are state cases relevant when there is no
attempted extra-territorial application of a state statute, and it is not necessary
again to review the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion in Curry v.
McCanless, decided this day * * *. For the present purpose it is sufficient to
note that under the principle estabished in Frick v. Pennsylvania, it is not enough
to say that a power of disposition is equivalent to ownership by a resident of a
State for ownership by a resident of a State gives that State no authority to
tax property not attributable to its domain. Mr. Frick owned his property in
New York and Massachusetts but still his own State of Pennsylvania could not
tax its transfer" (see note 46, supra, 307 U. S. at 392).
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vailing opinions in the Curry and Graves decisions.4 8 In the
Curry opinion half recognition is given to the Safe Deposit
decision (i.e., the right of the state of the trustee to tax)
while the Farmers decision is given colorable support.
What then may we expect in the future? If the determi-
native test of taxation is the privilege and protection afforded
an individual in his home state, might it not be argued that
for such protection, including his privilege to dispose of his
property, he might be subjected to a tax on the property
wherever situated and whether it consists of real, tangible or
intangible property? Perhaps Mr. Justice Holmes was cor-
rect when he stated that he saw nothing in the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent double taxation. Since the limitation
was judicially created, it can be judicially removed. But
whether it is fact or fiction, it has served this nation in a
self-sufficient degree. It has kept down the urge of state bar-
riers. Whether or not the aperture created by these decisions
will lead to more zealous attempts at other legislation re-
mains to be seen. In this field, too, a centralized curb may
some day be a necessity. It is to be hoped that that day will
not come.
CONCLUSION
In the space of three years we have witnessed a new trend
in the field of taxation. It will be the duty of those far more
qualified than the writer, to point out the advantages or
dangers attendant upon the course of. events to come as a
result of the signs that point the way. In this fast changing
world perhaps this is merely keeping in step.
ALLEN X. BERGMAN.
New York City.
48 See note 43, supra.
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